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ESSAYS 
11 
Pharmaceuticals:  Test Bed for European 
Themes on Trademarks and the Free 
Movement of Goods 
Ian S. Forrester, Q.C.* 
Anne N. Nielsen** 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Court of Justice is attempting to reconcile the 
national rights of trademark holders with the interests of traders 
and others in unconstrained commerce between member states of 
the European Union.  But the effects of that effort remain ambigu-
ous.  Classical trademark rights have been eroded in Europe to as-
sist pharmaceutical traders, but it is not clear whether the new rules 
will be confined to the pharmaceuticals industry or whether they 
will affect other trademarked products. 
The pharmaceuticals industry presents a convenient test bed for 
such issues because a number of factors make the industry 
uniquely susceptible to trademark litigation.  Trademark disputes 
before national courts usually involve such issues as allegations of 
confusing similarity between marks or assertions that marks have 
lapsed.  But the trademark issues before the European Court of 
Justice usually differ markedly from such inquiries.  For example, 
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one common question is whether a trademark holder may prevent 
the sale of genuine merchandise bearing a trademark affixed with-
out the holder’s consent because the product has been manipulated 
by a commercial rival.  The European Court of Justice has adopted 
an approach that tolerates more interference with the rightholder’s 
products than would be permitted under classical trademark doc-
trine.  A short summary of cases involving this radical approach 
reveals how a legal doctrine driven by good intentions may lead to 
unexpected and even unfortunate results. 
In a few cases, the European Court of Justice has considered 
the differences among substantive trademark laws of the European 
Union member states (“member states”) regarding what might con-
stitute infringement per se.  Generally, however, the European 
Court of Justice has declined to interfere with a member state’s 
definition of trademark law concepts, such as “confusing similar-
ity.”1 
Prior to the revolution in European trademark law in the 1970s, 
a trademark holder was permitted to challenge the sale of goods 
bearing its mark, even if the holder or an affiliate of the holder had 
legitimately affixed the mark in another country.  Thus, cross-
border commerce of trademarked goods was difficult without the 
approval of the local trademark holder.  As a result, a trademark 
holder was able to prevent unwelcome competition from another 
country. 
Pharmaceuticals were particularly prone to such obstacles.  
They were, and are still, sold at prices that effectively are set by 
the health care authorities and which vary greatly even between 
contiguous member states.  For most products, it was virtually im-
possible for the trademark holder to take effective action against 
 
1. See Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas), Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer 
& Co., 1976 E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482 (1976); Case C-317/91, Deutsche Ren-
ault, AG v. Audi, AG, 1993 E.C.R. I-6227, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 461 (1993); see also Case 
C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF, AG (“HAG II”), 1990 E.C.R. I-3711, [1990] 3 
C.M.L.R. 571 (1990) (commenting on lack of confusing similarity which existed be-
tween some marks).  According to the Advocate-General in HAG II, “the Bundespatent-
gericht held that the mark ‘Lucky Whip’ was liable to be confused with the mark 
‘Schöller-Nucki’, a decision that seems to postulate a body of consumers afflicted with 
an acute form of dyslexia.”  HAG II, 1990 E.C.R. I-3740, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 592. 
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every trader who might sell or import his goods.  In practice, mar-
ket forces would gradually lead to some similarity of pricing for 
most products subject to cross-border trading.  Nevertheless, be-
cause pharmaceuticals were distributed within a legally closed sys-
tem, the use of intellectual property rights could be an effective 
mechanism to prevent such trade.  For the same reason, cross-
border price competition had limited relevance. 
In its revolutionary series of judgments in the 1970s, involving 
the Dutch pharmaceutical trader Centrafarm, the European Court 
of Justice changed the law and precluded a business entity from us-
ing national trademarks and patents to block the unwelcome im-
portation and sale of genuine goods in one member state, when 
that business entity had placed the goods on the market in another 
member state.2  It would indeed have seemed absurd if, for exam-
ple, perfectly genuine Valium sold in the United Kingdom by 
“Roche United Kingdom” could be seized if offered for sale to 
pharmacists in the Netherlands because “Roche Netherlands” held 
the right to the Roche or Valium trademarks in the Netherlands.3  
So the earliest judgments were widely applauded despite some 
traces of over-exuberance. 
The European Court of Justice chose to favor the free move-
ment of goods between member states at the expense of intellec-
tual property rights.  This legal theory was creative.  The court 
recognized that some core rights could not be taken away from the 
intellectual property holder.  These core rights, called the “specific 
subject matter” or “essential function” of the rights, included the 
right to prevent piracy and unauthorized copying.4  Protection of 
these rights survived the scrutiny of articles 30 and 36 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”).5  
 
2. See Case 15/74, Centrafarm, BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 
2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974); Case 16/74, Centrafarm, BV v. Winthrop, BV, 1974 E.C.R. 
1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974). 
3. See Case C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesell-
schaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse, GmbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 
(1978). 
4. Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova, 1996 
E.C.R. I-3457, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151 (1996); see also HAG II, 1990 E.C.R. I-3733-34, 
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 585-86; Sterling Drug, 1974 E.C.R. 1162, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 503. 
5. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7. 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 
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These same articles, however, precluded the right to prevent cross-
border trade of trademarked products that had been marketed else-
where in the Common Market by a member of the local right hold-
ers’ group. 
The concepts of specific subject matter, essential function, and 
other ideas were the subject of much debate and analysis.  In truth, 
they are a good example of adroit judge-made law that provided 
theoretical underpinnings for a result deemed desirable by eco-
nomic and political concerns.  In a common market committed to 
the elimination of national economic frontiers, a manufacturer 
could not be allowed to use trademarks to prevent free trade in 
genuine goods among member states. 
The challenge to trademark rights then proceeded further.  
Centrafarm wanted to do more than merely sell the drugs in their 
original packaging.  Now traders, like Centrafarm, wished to re-
package the drugs in new boxes, or to relabel them, or to change 
the number of pills in the box, so as to adapt the goods to the mar-
ket in which they sought to sell the product.  According to the 
European Court of Justice, repackaging and relabeling were per-
missible, but were subject to specific conditions.6 
Then, the litigations fell quiet for a few years while the indus-
try adapted to the new regime.  Under this system, it was legal and 
common for a pharmaceutical trader to buy ten thousand, 20-dose 
packages of a drug in Greece, rearrange and sometimes even cut 
up the blister packs to change the number of pills per package, and 
print new packaging, which stated the manufacturer’s name, the 
trade name of the drug, and the parallel trader’s name, in order to 
resell 12,500 sixteen-dose packages in Germany. 
Consumer choice is irrelevant in the case of prescription drugs 
because the consumer receives what the pharmacist delivers, 
whether or not it has been bought from a parallel trader.  In addi-
tion, parallel trading always has been a hugely favored economic 
 
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; see Bristol-Myers, 1996 
E.C.R. I-3457, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151; see also Deutsche Renault, AG, 1993 E.C.R. I-
6251-54, ¶¶ 6-15, [1993] C.M.L.R. 469-73; HAG II, 1990 E.C.R. I-3729, ¶ 11, [1990] 3 
C.M.L.R. 580. 
6. See Hoffman-La Roche, 1978 E.C.R. 1167-68, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 244. 
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activity in European law, and pharmaceutical companies are 
deemed wealthy enough to bear its consequences.  Therefore, the 
rewriting of national trademark rules by the European Court of 
Justice was interesting, rather than controversial.  Trademark law-
yers complained, however, that classic trademark law had been 
rewritten in response to the needs of the pharmaceutical industry.  
In any case, application of the Court’s relabeling doctrines re-
mained industry-specific. 
Currently, a new decision threatens to agitate a very different 
industry.7  Frits Loendersloot is a parallel trader whose business 
involves buying Ballantine’s Scotch whisky and relabeling it with 
identical-looking labels that differ from the originals only in the 
omission of the manufacturer’s codes.8  Those codes allow Bal-
lantine to trace how a particular bottle fell into the hands of a par-
allel trader.9  Because parallel trading is no more welcome in the 
liquor industry than in the pharmaceutical trade, Ballantine is very 
unhappy.  Nevertheless, it appears difficult for the European Court 
to deny Loendersloot the right to do what is commonplace with 
pharmaceuticals.10 
This case raises a number of concerns.  First, it must be con-
sidered whether relabeling the whisky bottles in the local language 
would have any significant effects on the legal issues.  In addition, 
it is interesting to contemplate whether, assuming that the whisky 
would not be affected by rebottling, the trader could decant the 
whisky into smaller bottles suited for resale in a particular market, 
without risking legal sanctions.  This case indicates that when legal 
principles are stretched or created to achieve a particular outcome, 
surprising and unwelcome consequences may sometimes result.11 
This Essay describes the major swings in the approach by the 
European Court of Justice and contends that the current situation 
 
7. See Court Upholds Trademark Rights, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at 16 (describ-
ing the Loendersloot case); see also discussion infra Part V (reviewing the Loendersloot 
case). 
8. See Case 349/95, Frits Loendersloot v. George Ballantine & Sons, Ltd., (Eur. Ct. 
J. Feb. 27, 1997) (not yet reported). 
9. See id. 
10. See id. 
11. See id. 
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leaves rightholders with less protection than they ought to have.  
Part I describes one of the fundamental principles contained in the 
EC Treaty—the free movement of goods—and presents an over-
view of the development of the exhaustion doctrine.  Part II dis-
cusses cases where parallel traders have repackaged products bear-
ing trademarks without the proper authority.  Part III examines the 
EC Trademark Directive, which was drafted to harmonize the 
trademark laws that impede the free movement of goods.  Part IV 
explores whether case law developed with respect to parallel trad-
ing in the pharmaceutical industry has the influenced the legal 
status of parallel trading in other industries.  Part V reviews 
whether the exhaustion doctrine should apply on a European 
Community-wide basis or internationally.  This Essay concludes 
that the decisions by the European Court of Justice regarding 
pharmaceuticals trademarks could have an even greater impact on 
other trademarked products. 
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES:  THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 
The free movement of goods is one of the four fundamental 
principles underpinning the European Union.  Article 30 of the EC 
Treaty,12 which has been widely interpreted by the European Court 
of Justice, enshrines this principle.  Article 30 of the EC Treaty 
provides that, “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all meas-
ures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the follow-
ing provisions, be prohibited between member states.”13  The 
European Court of Justice has interpreted article 30 when consid-
ering cases that involve a conflict between national intellectual 
property rights and common market principles. 
An inherent conflict exists between the notion of a common 
market, in which goods are free to circulate across national bor-
 
12. EC TREATY, supra note 5. 
13. Id. art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 602.  A qualified exception to article 30 is found 
in article 36, which provides that: 
The provisions of [a]rticles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restric-
tions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of . . . the pro-
tection of industrial and commercial property.  Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between member states. 
Id. art. 36, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 605 (emphasis added). 
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ders, and national intellectual property rights.  By its nature, an in-
tellectual property right provides an individual with a monopoly 
rooted in national law.  A bundle of these national monopoly rights 
can be a means by which to divide territories along national lines.  
The difficulty for the European Court of Justice has been balancing 
the interests of rightholders against the European Community’s 
commitment to the free movement of goods. 
A.  Development of the Exhaustion Doctrine 
The European Court of Justice has wrestled with the challenge 
of producing a coherent and predictable rationale by which goods 
may be allowed to move freely among member states without un-
acceptable encroachment on the interests of intellectual property 
right holders.  As a result, the European Court of Justice has per-
mitted the use of national intellectual property rights in some cir-
cumstances, even where their invocation prevents imports from 
another member state, and has prohibited their use in some cases 
where the holder’s rights had been infringed. 
1. Exhaustion or Consent:  The Centrafarm Cases 
On the same day in 1974, the European Court of Justice issued 
its judgments in Centrafarm, BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,14 and Cen-
trafarm, BV v. Winthrop, BV.15  Sterling concerned patent rights 
and Winthrop dealt with trademark rights.  In both cases, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice held that if a patented or trademarked prod-
uct was put on the market in one member state by the manufacturer 
or with its consent, then the manufacturer could not block import 
of the product on the basis of its intellectual property rights.  In 
other words, if the owner of an intellectual property right protected 
by member state A had lawfully marketed its product in member 
state B, either directly, by providing his consent, or through an 
economic or legal dependent, the owner could not rely on the intel-
lectual property protection provided by member state A to prevent 
 
14. Case C-15/74, Centrafarm, BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 
2 C.M.L.R. 480. 
15. Case C-16/74, Centrafarm, BV v. Winthrop, BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 
C.M.L.R. 480. 
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the importation or marketing of its product into member state B. 
The European Court of Justice reasoned that the proprietor of 
parallel patents or trademarks had “exhausted” its right by first 
putting the product on the market in one member state and obtain-
ing the benefit of the intellectual property protection.  The proprie-
tor had thus consented to the sale of the product in another member 
state and could not prevent its importation.  The proprietor had ob-
tained the benefit of his intellectual property right by first placing 
the product on the market in a particular member state. 
This result, whereby Centrafarm could sell in the Netherlands 
patented and trademarked products first put on the market in the 
United Kingdom, was attractive from a policy point of view.  The 
need to provide Centrafarm with this result, however, required 
some unconvincing interpretation of the relevant texts.  At the time 
of the Centrafarm cases, the United Kingdom had only recently 
acceded to the European Community.  The Accession Treaty for 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark (“Accession Treaty”)16 
provided that movement of goods provisions could only be in-
voked with respect to goods originating, inter alia, in the United 
Kingdom as of January 1, 1975.  Specifically, paragraph 2 of arti-
cle 42 of the Accession Treaty provided that “measures having 
equivalent effect to [quantitative] restrictions shall be abolished by 
1 January 1975 at the latest.”17  Most readers of this article would 
have concluded, and rightly so, that until January 1, 1975, intellec-
tual property rights or other measures of equivalent effect could be 
invoked, even where the result was the partitioning of the Common 
Market. 
The European Court of Justice, however, clearly did not want 
this result.  The European Court of Justice thus interpreted article 
42(2) to apply only to articles 30 and 32 to 35 of the EC Treaty.18  
As a result, “article 42 of the Act of Accession has no effect upon 
prohibitions on importation arising from national legislation con-
cerning industrial and commercial property.”19  Accordingly, arti-
 
16. Act of Accession, O.J. L 73/14 (1972). 
17. Id. O.J. L 73/14 at 23. 
18. EC Treaty, supra note 5. 
19. Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1197, ¶ 28, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 509. 
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cle 42 of the Accession Treaty cannot be employed to block impor-
tation into the Netherlands of goods originally marketed in the 
United Kingdom under the above conditions by the trademark 
owner or with its consent, even before January 1, 1975.20 
In effect, the European Court of Justice seemed to argue that, 
because there was no explicit transitional provision in the Acces-
sion Treaty21 for article 36 of the EC Treaty,22 the exceptions set 
forth in article 36 could not be invoked, notwithstanding that the 
provisions concerning measures of equivalent effect were subject 
to a transitional provision.  The European Court of Justice’s rea-
soning with regard to the Accession Treaty was contrived.  The 
credibility of its general approach to problems involving free 
movement of goods might have been enhanced, but only at the ex-
pense of legal certainty with regard to the application of the Ac-
cession Treaty.  After the Centrafarm battles, the stage was set for 
the astonishing judgment in HAG I.23 
2. HAG I:  Round One—1974 
In Van Zuylen Frères v. HAG, AG (“HAG I”),24 the European 
Court of Justice needed to apply the exhaustion or consent doctrine 
in a case where the same trademark was applied to coffee manu-
factured by two separate companies in circumstances where there 
was no consent, but where the two marks had a common origin. 
The HAG group of companies throughout Europe had held the 
same trademark.  The Belgian/Luxembourg mark, however, was 
expropriated as enemy property during the Second World War and 
sold to a rival coffee maker.  The Luxembourg holder of the 
trademark tried to use its trademark rights to prevent imports of the 
product from Germany, which were put on the market by a differ-
ent manufacturer but under the same trademark.  The European 
Court of Justice, in an obvious effort to promote the free move-
ment of goods, found that because the trademarks had once been 
 
20. See id. at 1196, ¶ 30, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 510-11. 
21. Accession Treaty, supra note 16. 
22. EC Treaty, supra note 5. 
23. Van Zuylen Frères v. HAG, AG (“HAG I”), Case C-192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731, 
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127. 
24. Id. 
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commonly owned, it was contrary to articles 30 and 36 of the EC 
Treaty to prevent the German exports into Luxembourg.25 
The European Court of Justice did not accept the argument that 
the purpose of a trademark is to inform the consumer about the 
origin of the product.26  Also, the European Court of Justice noted 
that consumers would be harmed if one shop could sell two differ-
ent goods bearing an identical trademark.27  The court ruled that a 
trademark, more than any other industrial property right, could re-
sult in the partitioning of the Common Market because the right is 
not subject to time limitations, and thus, deserves less protection 
than other industrial property rights.28  Its role of informing con-
sumers could be ensured by means that were less likely to affect 
the free movement of goods.  For example, one member of the 
European Court of Justice suggested sticking flags on the packets 
of coffee to distinguish the German and Luxembourg brands of 
coffee. 
3. HAG II:  Round Two—1990 
The facts of SA CNL-Sucal, NV v. HAG GF, AG (“HAG II”)29 
were similar to those of HAG I, except that in HAG II, the German 
rightholder challenged imports by the Belgian rightholder.  The 
European Court of Justice, influenced by a magisterial opinion 
from Advocate General Jacobs, reversed its ruling in HAG I.30  The 
court held that the German rightholder could oppose the imports 
from Belgium because the compulsory division of the trademark 
had deprived the German rightholder the possibility of consenting 
to the marketing of similar products under an identical or similar, 
 
25. In HAG I, the European Court of Justice held that: 
To prohibit the marketing in a member state of a product legally bearing a 
trade mark in another member state, for the sole reason that an identical trade 
mark having the same origin exists in the first State, is incompatible with the 
provisions providing for free movement of goods within the Common Market. 
Id. at 744, ¶ 15, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 144. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. Case C-10/89, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (1990). 
30. See id. 
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and therefore confusing, trademark in Belgium.31 
The European Court of Justice determined that expropriation 
did not imply consent.32  Therefore, the intellectual property right 
in question was not exhausted, and the sale could be blocked.  The 
court, however, went one step further, stating that the essential 
function of the trademark was to guarantee the identity of the ori-
gin of the marked product to the consumer or ultimate user by ena-
bling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish that 
product from products which have another origin.33  This statement 
attributes great weight to consumer perceptions and suggests that, 
even if the trademark holder has consented to the use of his trade-
mark, he still might prevent the entrance of products bearing that 
trademark into a member state if consumers will be confused. 
In sum, HAG II raised, but did not settle, the key issue of 
whether the holder of a trademark could prevent, in the interest of 
avoiding consumer or user confusion, a product bearing that 
trademark from being sold on the market of another member state 
in a case involving a consensual sale or perhaps even licensing. 
B. The Relationship Between Assignment and Exhaustion of 
Trademark Rights 
The question raised in HAG II was answered in IHT Interna-
tionale Heiztechnik, GmbH v. Ideal-Standard, GmbH.34  In Ideal-
Standard, the American Standard group had owned the trademark 
“Ideal-Standard.”35  The German and French subsidiaries of 
 
31. See id. 
32. See id. 
33. According to the European Court of Justice: 
In such circumstances, the essential function of the trade mark would be jeop-
ardized if the proprietor of the trademark could not exercise the right conferred 
on him by national legislation to oppose the importation of similar goods bear-
ing a designation liable to be confused with his own trade mark, because, in 
such a situation, consumers would no longer be able to identify for certain the 
origin of the marked goods and the proprietor of the trade mark could be held 
responsible for the poor quality of goods for which he was in no way account-
able. 
Id. at I-3759, ¶ 16, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 608. 
34. Case C-9/93, 1994 E.C.R. I-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994). 
35. See id. 
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American Standard held the trademark for sanitary fittings and 
heating equipment in Germany and France.36  The French subsidi-
ary sold the trademark for heating equipment to Société Générale 
de Fonderie (“SGF”), an unrelated French company.37 
SGF later assigned its trademark rights to another French com-
pany called Compagnic Internationale du Chauffage (“CICh”).38  
When CICh sought to market its heating equipment in Germany 
under the “Ideal-Standard” trademark, the German subsidiary of 
American Standard, Ideal-Standard GmbH, objected and initiated 
trademark infringement proceedings.39 
The European Court of Justice distinguished the Ideal-
Standard situation from that in HAG II because the Ideal-Standard 
dispute involved different products with the same name.40  Addi-
tionally, the court applying the exhaustion or consent doctrine to 
the situation in which a trademark right is assigned.41  The court 
rejected the Commission’s argument that if a trademark right is 
voluntarily sold, then consent has been given to the marketing of 
competing products.42  The court stated that an assignment does 
not constitute “the consent required for application of the doctrine 
of exhaustion of rights.  For that, the owner of the right in the im-
porting State must . . . determine the products to which the trade 
mark may be affixed in the exporting State and . . . control their 
quality.”43  The court noted that this power is eliminated when 
control over the trademark is surrendered to a third party having no 
 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. In Ideal-Standard, the European Court of Justice stated that: 
The HAG II case, whose bearing on the main proceedings is the point of the 
question put by the national court, related to a situation where it was not just 
the name that was identical but also the products marketed by the parties to the 
dispute.  This dispute, by contrast, relates to the use of an identical device for 
different products since Ideal-Standard GmbH is relying on its registration of 
the trade mark “Ideal Standard” for sanitary fittings in order to oppose the use 
of that device for heating equipment. 
Id. at I-2841-42, ¶ 15, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 904. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
43. Id. at I-2850, ¶ 43, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 909. 
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economic link with the assignor.44 
Notwithstanding the factual differences between Ideal-
Standard and HAG II, the European Court of Justice reiterated its 
reasoning from HAG II and determined that a voluntary assign-
ment of a trademark right did not result in exhaustion of the trade-
mark right.  Thus, Ideal-Standard GmbH could prevent the impor-
tation of the French product into Germany. 
The reasoning in HAG II and Ideal-Standard suggests that the 
possibility of consumer confusion or damage to the reputation of 
the trademark holder justifies possible partitioning of national 
markets.  In other words, the rights of trademark holders prevail 
over the free movement of goods.  Although this jurisprudence ap-
plies when the products bearing the same mark are manufactured 
by different parties, it does not appear to apply to those cases 
where one party manufactures the product at issue, and the issue is 
the parallel importation of that product from one member state to 
another. 
II. THE REPACKAGING CASES REVISITED:  IN SEARCH OF A 
RATIONALE 
The European Court of Justice has experienced great difficulty 
in attempting to find a coherent rationale for applying European 
Community law to trademarks and pharmaceuticals.  The issue is 
complicated by differences in pricing, health care, and reimburse-
ment policies for pharmaceutical products in member states.45  Be-
cause of price differentials, parallel trade in pharmaceutical prod-
ucts is not just a marginal phenomenon, but a major industry.  A 
pharmaceutical sold in member state A may require repackaging 
before sale in member state B.  Nevertheless, it is often worthwhile 
for the parallel importer to repackage and relabel, which often in-
volves re-affixing the trademark. 
 
44. See id. 
45. The European Commission has recognized this dilemma, stating that, “The dif-
ferences reported in the pricing of identical pharmaceutical products across the Commu-
nity are largely the result of the different pricing and refund systems of member state 
health insurance schemes.”  Commission, Answer to Written Question E-2181/93, 1994 
O.J. (C 46) 45. 
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A. The Continuing Battle Between Centrafarm and the 
Pharmaceutical Companies 
Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm46 involved a trademarked 
pharmaceutical, Valium, that was purchased in the United King-
dom, repackaged in the Netherlands, and sold in Germany.47  Spe-
cifically, Centrafarm purchased Valium in packets of one hundred 
and five hundred, and repackaged them into bottles containing one 
thousand tablets.48  The new bottles and the external wrappings 
had the names “Valium” and “Roche” printed on them, although in 
slightly different form than the original packaging.49  Those bottles 
were produced for sale to hospitals and pharmacies that dispensed 
the tablets, so there was no risk of consumer confusion.50  In this 
case, the trademark was clearly re-affixed to the new packaging. 
The issue before the European Court of Justice was whether 
the repackaging and re-affixing of the trademarks contravened the 
exclusive rights of the holder to affix trademarks.  The European 
Court of Justice reiterated that the holder of the trademark is per-
mitted to affix that trademark for the purpose of putting a product 
into circulation for the first time.  The proprietor is therefore pro-
tected against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status 
and reputation of the trademark by selling products not legally 
bearing that mark.  In this case, Centrafarm had attached the Val-
ium and Roche names to bottles filled by Centrafarm.51 
Had the European Court of Justice strictly applied the exhaus-
tion or consent doctrine in this case, it would have led to the im-
mediate result that Hoffmann-La Roche had “exhausted” its rights 
because it had sold the product, thereby implying consent to the re-
sale of the product by Centrafarm.  This case, however, involved 
more than just the reselling of the product; there was also repack-
aging.52 
 
46. Case C-102/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, 1141-42, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217, 219-20. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. To deal with the specific issue of repackaging, the Court stated that: 
In order to answer the question whether that exclusive right involves the right 
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The European Court of Justice set forth the general rule that 
the trademark holder can prevent “a product to which the trade-
mark has lawfully been applied in one of those States from being 
marketed in the other member state after it has been inserted in 
new packaging to which the trade-mark has been affixed by a third 
party.”53  The court, however, ever preoccupied with encouraging 
legitimate cross-border trade, introduced a balancing test.  Accord-
ing to the European Court of Justice, the prevention of marketing 
by a parallel importer could not be permitted if it in fact consti-
tuted a “disguised restriction on trade.”54  The repackaging and 
remarking would be permitted if four factors were met:  (1) the use 
of the trademark right by the proprietor resulted in artificial parti-
tioning of the markets between member states; (2) repackaging did 
not negatively affect the original condition of the product; (3) the 
proprietor had received notice prior to the marketing of the repack-
aged products; and (4) the new packaging indicated who repack-
aged the product.55 
Initially, the first factor was assumed to be a difficult one for a 
parallel importer to overcome, especially where the parallel im-
porter held the burden of demonstrating that the trademark holder’s 
use of the of the mark artificially partitioned the markets among 
member states.  Some argued, however, that if the other three fac-
tors were satisfied, the first factor had to be satisfied as well.  The 
second factor had a health and safety rationale, hence the parallel 
 
to prevent the trade-mark being affixed by a third person after the product has 
been repackaged, regard must be had to the essential function of the trade-
mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the trade-marked prod-
uct to the consumer or ultimate user, by enabling him without any possibility 
of confusion to distinguish that product from products which have another ori-
gin.  This guarantee of origin means that the consumer or ultimate user can be 
certain that a trade-marked product which is sold to him has not been subject at 
a previous stage of marketing to interference by a third person, without the au-
thorization of the proprietor of the trade-mark, such as to affect the original 
condition of the product.  The right attributed to the proprietor of preventing 
any use of the trade-mark which is likely to impair the guarantee of origin so 
understood is therefore part of the specific subject-matter of the trade-mark 
right. 
Id. at 1164, ¶ 7, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 241. 
53. Id. at 1165-66, ¶ 14, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 243. 
54. Id. at 1167, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 244. 
55. Id. at 1167-68, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 244. 
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trader was required to demonstrate that the repackaging did not 
adversely affect the original condition of the product.  The third 
and fourth factors were relatively easy to satisfy. 
B. Artificial Market Partitions by Trademark Owners 
In Centrafarm, BV v. American Home Products Corp.,56 the 
European Court of Justice needed to determine whether the use of 
two separate trademarks artificially partitioned the market.  The 
European Court of Justice stated that such partitioning occurred, 
“if it is established that the proprietor of different marks has fol-
lowed the practice of using such marks for the purpose of artifi-
cially partitioning the markets.”57  Again the European Court of 
Justice suggested that the trademark owner’s intent to artificially 
partition markets was a required showing. 
1. Repackaging Doctrine 
The reasoning of Hoffmann-La Roche58 was applied in Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm., GmbH.59  The facts of Pfizer, however, dif-
fered from those of Hoffmann-La Roche in that the trademark was 
not re-affixed to the external packaging. 
In Pfizer, the European Court of Justice found that the repack-
aging was merely the replacing of the outer wrapping without 
touching the internal packaging.60  The trademark was not re-
affixed; instead, the trademark on the internal packaging was made 
visible through the new external wrapping.61  The European Court 
of Justice held that the repackaging did not expose the product to 
interferences or influences that would affect its original condition, 
and that final users of the product were unlikely to be misled re-
garding the product’s origin.62 
This case did not involve the re-affixing of a trademark, but did 
 
56. Case C-3/78, 1978 E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 (1978). 
57. Id. at 1823 [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 344. 
58. Case C-102/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (1978). 
59. Case C-1/81, 1981 E.C.R. 2913, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 406 (1981). 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. at 2926, ¶ 11, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 421. 
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involve repackaging.  Apparently, the European Court of Justice 
was more comfortable permitting repackaging that did not also in-
volve the re-affixing of the trademark. 
After this decision, no relabeling cases were referred to the 
European Court of Justice for approximately ten years.  During 
that time, traders developed the practice of filling original packets 
with cut-up blisters.  The traders expanded the terrain that they had 
secured in Centrafarm63 by repackaging and re-labeling without 
being called upon to prove artificial partitioning in court.  In par-
ticular, the issue of whether subjective intent of the rightholder had 
to be shown was unsettled.  The challenge to these practices came 
quite late. 
2. Recent Applications of Repackaging Doctrine 
The Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm factors have been ap-
plied in seven recent repackaging cases involving parallel traders:  
Paranova, Eurim-Pharm, and MPA Pharma.64  In four of these 
cases, involving Paranova or MPA Pharma, the pharmaceutical 
products at issue were repackaged and the trademark re-affixed, 
thereby presenting the overall style of the parallel importer, rather 
than mimicking the original package.  In the other three cases, in-
volving Eurim-Pharm, the pharmaceutical products were repack-
aged in an arguably sloppy fashion, with blisters cut and arranged 
in certain package sizes. 
When the recent repackaging cases were referred to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, many anticipated that the European Court of 
Justice would clarify the meaning of the term “artificial partition-
ing of the market.”65  Specifically at issue was whether the Euro-
pean Court of Justice would relax the burden of proof placed on 
the importer, and whether it would alter or amend any of the other 
 
63. Centrafarm, BV v. American Home Products Corp., Case C-3/78, 1978 E.C.R. 
1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 (1978). 
64. Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova, 
1996 E.C.R. I-3457, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151 (1996); Joined Cases C-71/94, C-72/94 & 
C-73/94, Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel v. Beiersdorf, 1996 E.C.R. I-3603, [1997] 1 
C.M.L.R. 1222 (1996); Case C-232/94, MPA Pharma, GmbH v. Rhône-Poulenc Pharma, 
GmbH, 1996 E.C.R. I-3671 (1996). 
65. Hoffman-La Roche, 1978 E.C.R. 1166, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 244. 
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three conditions imposed by Hoffmann-La Roche.66  On July 11, 
1996, in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova,67 the European Court 
of Justice ruled that, “[T]he trademark owner may legitimately op-
pose the further marketing of a pharmaceutical product where the 
importer has repackaged the product and reaffixed the trademark 
unless [certain conditions are met].”68 
The first condition of Bristol-Myers parallels the first condition 
in Hoffmann-La Roche and focuses upon the artificial partitioning 
of the market.  The European Court of Justice provided a specific 
example of when artificial partitioning of the market would occur 
if cross-border trade is prevented because of the existence of dif-
ferent package sizes for the identical product.  The court, however, 
specifically included the requirement that “the repackaging carried 
out by the importer is necessary in order to market the product in 
the member state of importation.”69  Query whether any repackag-
 
66. Id. at 1167-68, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 244. 
67. 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151 (1996). 
68. Id.  Bristol-Myers set forth the following conditions: 
—[The] establish[ment] that reliance on trademark rights by the owner in order 
to oppose the marketing of repackaged products under that trade mark would 
contribute to the artificial partitioning of the markets between member states; 
such is the case, in particular, where the owner has put an identical pharmaceu-
tical product on the market in several member states in various forms of pack-
aging, and the repackaging carried out by the importer is necessary in order to 
market the product in the member state of importation, and is carried out in 
such conditions that the original condition of the product cannot be affected by 
it; that condition does not, however, imply that it must be established that the 
trademark owner deliberately sought to partition the markets between member 
states; 
—[The] show[ing] that the repackaging cannot affect the original condition of 
the product inside the packaging . . . ; 
—[T]he new packaging clearly states who repackaged the product and the 
name of the manufacturer in print such that a person with normal eyesight, ex-
ercising a normal degree of attentiveness, would be in a position to under-
stand . . . ; 
—[T]he presentation of the repackaged product is not such as to be liable to 
damage the reputation of the trademark and of its owners; thus, the packaging 
must not be defective, of poor quality, or untidy; and 
—[T]he importer gives notice to the trademark owner before the repackaged 
product is put on sale, and, on demand, supplies him with a specimen of the re-
packaged product. 
Id. 
69. Id. (emphasis added). 
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ing at all or simply repackaging in the style of the parallel im-
porter, such as Paranova, is permitted.  The European Court of Jus-
tice unfortunately failed to address specifically the issue of 
Paranova’s style and whether the use of this style usurped the 
owner’s trademark.  The European Court of Justice also stressed 
that the original condition of the product may not be called into 
question, even though this point was specifically addressed by the 
Court.70  Then the court concluded that this particular condition 
“does not, however, imply that it must be established that the 
trademark owner deliberately sought to partition the markets be-
tween member states.”71  This latter phrase indicates that the bur-
den of proof is no longer on the parallel importer to demonstrate 
that the trademark owner had used different package sizes to delib-
erately partition the market. 
The second condition is the same one found in the original 
Hoffmann-La Roche judgment,72 and the third condition is similar 
to the fourth condition in the original Hoffmann-La Roche judg-
ment.  The European Court of Justice, however, has additionally 
required that the name of the manufacturer appear and the print be 
such that a person with “normal eyesight, exercising a normal de-
gree of attentiveness” would understand that the product had been 
repackaged and parallel imported.73 
The fourth condition is new and gives the trademark owner ad-
ditional protection in those cases where the packaging is defective, 
of poor quality, or untidy.  The European Court of Justice, how-
ever, stated that the importance of packaging varies depending 
upon to whom the product is presented.74  In addition, the court 
 
70. See id. 
71. Id. 
72. 1978 E.C.R. 1167, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 218. 
73. Bristol-Meyers, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, at ¶ 79, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1219. 
74. Eurim-Pharm Arznemittel v. Beiersdorf, AG, 1996 E.C.R. I-3603, [1997] 1 
C.M.L.R. 1238.  In Eurim-Pharm, the court explained that: 
[T]he requirements to be met by the presentation of a repackaged pharmaceuti-
cal product vary according to whether the product is sold to hospitals or, 
through pharmacies, to consumers.  In the former case, the products are admin-
istered to patients by professionals, for whom the presentation of the product is 
of little importance.  In the latter case, the presentation of the product is of 
greater importance for the consumer, even if the fact that the products in ques-
tion are subject to prescription by a doctor may in itself give consumers some 
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stated that it is for the national court to determine whether original 
external packaging and loose blister packs “constitute . . . an un-
tidy form of packaging liable to damage the reputation of the trade 
mark.”75  In particular, “[a]s for the cutting of blister packs, it is for 
that court to assess in each particular case whether it has been car-
ried out in such a manner that the reputation of the trademark 
might suffer.”76 
The fifth condition is similar to the third condition in the origi-
nal Hoffmann-La Roche judgment.  The European Court of Justice, 
however, added the requirement that the parallel importer must 
provide, on demand, a specimen of the repackaged product.77 
C. Trademarks and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The European Court of Justice’s efforts to secure the free 
movement of goods has particularly affected the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Due to the court’s decision in Bristol Myers, a signifi-
cant number of traders, constituting a small industry, engage in the 
buying, repackaging, and relabeling of pharmaceuticals to take ad-
vantage of price differentials that are the result of member state ac-
tion. 
It would be wrong to suggest that the European Court of Jus-
tice’s judgments in cases involving pharmaceutical products have 
been ill considered or careless.  The court has faced many difficult 
issues.  Should a trademark holder in several member states be en-
titled to prevent cross border trade at will?  Plainly not.  Might 
there be circumstances in which the trademarking policy for a 
product was a disguised means to prevent cross-border trade, in 
which case European Community considerations should prevail 
over purely national ones?  Plainly yes. 
It is unclear, however, whether the current rules on repackag-
ing and relabeling adequately respect the interests of the 
rightholder.  The product is sold in different member states at dif-
 
degree of confidence in the quality of the product . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See Bristol-Meyers, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, 87, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151. 
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ferent prices due to national rules, but not necessarily the choice of 
the supplier.  Thus, the encroachment upon the trademark holder’s 
rights in the case of repackaging and relabeling may be rather se-
vere. 
III. THE EC TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE 
In 1988, the Council adopted the First Trademark Directive 
(“Trademark Directive”)78 to approximate the member states’ laws 
relating to trademarks.  The member states were required to im-
plement the Trademark Directive by December 31, 1992.  The 
Trademark Directive does not aim to harmonize trademark law 
fully, but only those provisions of national law most likely to im-
pede the free movement of goods in the European Community.  
Thus, the Trademark Directive does not cover the registration, nul-
lity, and invalidity of trademarks, or the rules governing their 
transfer or assignment.79 
The Trademark Directive applies to all registered national 
marks regarding products and services, whether individual, collec-
tive, or guarantee marks.  Trademarks are broadly defined as “any 
sign capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, 
including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of 
goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are capable 
of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings.”80 
The Trademark Directive also provides an exhaustive list of 
optional or mandatory grounds for refusal or invalidity, divided be-
tween absolute grounds for refusal under article 3, and relative 
grounds under article 4.81  The Trademark Directive does not list 
the acts reserved to the trademark holder, but specifies that he has 
an exclusive right to prevent third parties from using (1) an identi-
cal trademark without his consent, in relation to goods or services 
identical to those for which the trademark is registered; or (2) an 
identical or similar trademark in relation to similar goods or ser-
 
78. See Council Directive 89/104, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1. 
79. See id. 
80. Id. art. 2, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 2. 
81. See id. 
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vices, where there is a risk of public confusion.82 
Under article 7, only the first marketing in the European Union 
results in exhaustion of trademark rights.83  This means that trade-
mark rightholders may oppose imports into the European Union of 
trademarked goods first put on the market outside the European 
Union.  In Bristol-Myers,84 the European Court of Justice made it 
clear that article 7 of the Trademark Directive, and in particular ar-
ticle 7(2), is to be given the same interpretation as that given by the 
Court to articles 30 and 36.85 
IV. FUTURE APPLICATION:  THE QUESTION OF TRANSFER OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY TRADEMARK DOCTRINES 
In Frits Loendersloot v. George Ballantine & Son Ltd.,86 the 
question of repackaging trademarked goods was raised in the con-
text of alcoholic drinks.  Allegedly, a parallel importer of alcoholic 
drinks removed from the whisky bottles the labels, identification 
numbers, names of the original importers, and the word “pure.”87  
The parallel importer then re-affixed either an original or copied 
label and the name of an importer having no contractual relation-
ship with the owner of the mark and exported the bottles to traders 
in France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Ja-
pan.88 
Advocate General Jacobs, in his conclusions, first noted that it 
is the Court’s duty “to develop further, in the context of the rela-
beling by a parallel importer of alcoholic drinks, the principles laid 
down in its ruling concerning parallel imports of repackaged phar-
 
82. Id. art. 5, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 2. 
83. Id. art 7, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 2. 
84. 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, [1997] C.M.L.R. 1151 
85. See id.  In Bristol-Myers the European Court of Justice stated that: 
In accordance with the case law, [a]rticle 7(2) of the directive must therefore be 
interpreted as meaning that a trade-mark owner may legitimately oppose the 
further marketing of a pharmaceutical product where the importer has repack-
aged it and re-affixed the trademark, unless the four conditions set out in the 
Hoffmann-La Roche judgment . . . have been met. 
Id. at ¶ 50. 
86. Case C-349/95 (Eur. Ct. J. Feb 27, 1997) (not yet reported). 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
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pharmaceutical products.”89  Specifically at issue was “whether a 
trademark proprietor may rely on his trademark in order to prevent 
the relabeling of alcoholic drinks undertaken with a view to re-
moving identification marks allegedly used by the proprietor to 
monitor parallel imports and detect shortcomings in his sales net-
work.”90 
Advocate General Jacobs relied on the jurisprudence devel-
oped in the pharmaceutical repackaging cases when arriving at the 
following conclusions.  First, a trademark owner cannot use his 
rights to prevent a parallel importer from repackaging goods bear-
ing the mark and re-affixing the mark to the repackaged goods 
when the use of the right by the owner will “contribute to the arti-
ficial partitioning of the markets between member states; provided 
that in the course of such repackaging:  (i) the guarantee of origin 
is not impaired; (ii) the original condition of the product is not ad-
versely affected; and (iii) the reputation of the trademark is not 
damaged.”91  Second, subject to the same conditions as the first 
conclusion, a trademark owner cannot exercise his rights to pre-
vent a parallel trader from omitting the term “pure,” which ap-
peared on the original labels, or replacing the importer’s name.92  
Finally, subject to the same conditions as the other conclusions, a 
trademark owner cannot exercise his rights to prevent “the removal 
of identification marks which he has affixed on or underneath the 
labels.”93 
After announcing his decision, Advocate General Jacobs pro-
posed that the European Court of Justice issue a preliminary ruling 
on its interpretation of article 36 of the Accession Treaty, which 
concerned restrictions on intra-Community trade.94  The European 
Court of Justice also compared the repackaging of alcohol to prior 
cases affecting pharmaceuticals.95  Additionally, the European 
 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See Trademark Rights:  Court Ruling on Re-Labelling Whiskey Bottles, EUR. 
REP., Nov. 22, 1997. 
95. See id. 
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Court of Justice applied its case law to article 36.96  The European 
Court of Justice concluded that “article 36 of the Treaty has to be 
interpreted as implying that even if this represents an obstacle to 
intra-Community trade, the trademark owner may exercise this 
right to prevent a third party from removing and then putting back 
or replacing labels displaying the holder’s mark, unless” (1) the 
trademark owner’s use of the right to prevent re-labeled products 
from “being marketed under this trademark would contribute to an 
artificial partitioning of member states’ markets;” (2) the re-
labeling does not affect “the original state of the product;” (3) the 
re-labeled product is not packaged “to harm the reputation of the 
trademark and that of its owner;” or (4) the person re-labeler of  
the product “warns the trademark owner of the re-labeling process” 
before selling the re-labeled products.97  The European Court of 
Justice thus followed the spirit of Advocate General Jacobs’ con-
clusions. 
Under certain circumstances, the European Court of Justice 
will sanction the removal and re-affixing of trademarks to prod-
ucts.  The moral equities appear to have changed somewhat, 
though it was not easy for the European Court of Justice to justify 
departing from the jurisprudence established in a long series of 
cases concerning pharmaceuticals. 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the European Court of Justice 
has rewritten traditional trademark law to assist in the development 
of unofficial cross-border trade.  Judging by the difficulties en-
countered by Centrafarm, such development seemed unlikely to 
proceed without some judicial encouragement.  Consumers faced a 
potential for slight confusion, but essentially were not prejudiced.  
The ruling by the European Court of Justice significantly affected 
the pharmaceutical companies who were now obliged, like other 
product manufacturers, to accept competition from parallel im-
ports.  The European Court of Justice created a set of sophisticated 
rules involving various criteria, balance of proof, and the like.  As 
a response to the industry’s needs, the European Court of Justice 
was artful, careful, and pragmatic. 
 
96. See id. 
97. Id. 
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It will be interesting to see whether the decision in Loender-
sloot will completely resolve the issues regarding an operator’s 
right to protect his mark against parallel trading.  Loendersloot’s 
effect on the rights so laboriously secured by Centrafarm, Eurim-
Pharm, and Paranova will be significant as well.  The producers of 
products that can be easily transported from cheap member states 
to expensive member states, and which depend on advertising and 
consumer brand recognition for sales, such as alcohol, perfumes, 
golf balls, batteries, and cigarettes, will likely be very concerned 
about broadening the rights of their competitors. 
The onus could be placed on trademark owners to identify in-
stances of damaging repackaging and to take action on these 
grounds.  It will be left for the national court to determine whether 
the relabeling and re-affixing of the trademark damages the reputa-
tion of the trademark holder. 
V. THE SCOPE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXHAUSTION 
DOCTRINE 
Some questions have arisen as to whether the European Com-
munity should follow an international, worldwide exhaustion doc-
trine.  The answer is no.  The exhaustion doctrine applies only to 
the European Community.  This was recently confirmed in Phy-
theron International, SA v. Jean Bourdon, SA.98  The European 
Court of Justice asked two questions:  (1) whether a trader of 
member state A may import a genuine trademarked product, which 
has not undergone any processing or alteration in packaging, ex-
cept for changes on the label designed to comply with the legal re-
quirements of member state A, from member state B, where the 
product is approved and marketed under the same trademark, and 
market the product in member state A; and (2) whether a prohibi-
tion based on the legislation of a member state infringes upon arti-
cle 30 of the Accession Treaty.99 
The facts, as referred to by the national court, indicated that a 
subsidiary of Schering, a company belonging to the German 
Hoechst group, had manufactured the plant health product at issue 
 
98. Case C-352/95, [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. 199. 
99. See id. 
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in Turkey.  A Schering affiliate thereafter imported the product 
into Germany.100 
In essence, the European Court of Justice rejected the notion of 
international exhaustion and re-affirmed the notion of European 
Community exhaustion.  The European Court of Justice referred to 
article 7 of the Trademark Directive.  Article 7, the Court ob-
served, is worded in general terms and comprehensively regulates 
the question of the exhaustion of trademark rights for products 
trade in the European Community.  The European Court of Justice 
held that, under article 7, that member state A could not apply a 
rule that prevents a trademark owner from importing a product 
protected by the mark when (1) the product is manufactured in a 
non-Member country; (2) the product is imported into member 
state B “by the owner of the mark or by another company in the 
same group as the owner of the mark;” (3) the product was law-
fully acquired in member state B by an independent trader, who 
exported it to member state A; (4) the product was neither proc-
essed nor repackaged, apart from any relabeling necessary to com-
ply with the information-labeling legislation of the member state of 
import; and (5) the same group held the trademark rights in both 
member states A and B.101  In other words, if the owner of the mark 
or an affiliated company of the owner of the mark brings a product 
into the European Community, then the products are entitled to 
free circulation.  Conversely, if the products do not enter into the 
European Community due to the efforts or consent of the owner of 
the mark, the owner may institute infringement proceedings.  The 
European Court of Justice consequently confirmed European 
Community exhaustion, and thereby rejected the doctrine of inter-
national exhaustion of trademarks.  Thus, there is some good news 
for trademark owners. 
 
100. During the proceedings before the court, however, it was stated that the prod-
uct had been manufactured in Germany and then exported to Turkey.  See id.  The batch 
at issue was acquired from a Turkish subsidiary of the Hoechst group by an independent 
trader and then sold to Phytheron.  See id.  The Court stated that in the present case it 
could answer the national court’s application only on the basis of the facts as they ap-
peared from the order of reference.  See id. 
101. Id. at 563. 
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CONCLUSION 
Trademarks are meant to avoid consumer confusion and pro-
tect the reputation of the trademark owner.  Yet they also have 
been used to prevent the sale of non-spurious goods marketed with 
the rightholder’s consent in another country.  Inside the European 
Community, trademarks carry the potential to hinder parallel im-
ports, thereby impeding a major policy goal:  the removal of obsta-
cles to the free movement of goods.  Consequently, the rights of 
the trademark holder have been significantly encroached upon as a 
necessary price to assist parallel trading.  The European Court of 
Justice has made sound judgments regarding exhaustion within the 
European Community, but its judgments regarding relabeling and 
repackaging have substantially compromised classical trademark 
rights in the pharmaceuticals industry.  In the end, those judgments 
could have an even greater impact on other manufacturers for 
whom trademarks are more important than they are for the phar-
maceuticals industry. 
